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GENERAL HEADINGS

Cases Reported this Week.

Current Topics.

The Termination of the War.

A CORRESPONDENT has been good enough to call our attention to an error in the dates we gave recently (31st July, *ante*, p. 677) with respect to the termination of the war with Germany. The official date was 10th January, 1920—the date of ratification—and this was fixed by Order in Council of 9th February. We gave the reference to the Order (14th February, *ante*, p. 277), so that the error was capable of correction from our own pages, and, indeed, the dates as we gave them were taken from the Order, but clearly something happened. A further step towards the general peace which is essential to the "termination of the war" has been taken in the signing of the Treaty with Turkey. This took place at Sèvres on 10th August. The dates of ratification of treaties so far are—with Germany, 10th January; Austria, 16th July; Bulgaria, 9th August; and dates of signing, where there has been no ratification—Hungary, 4th June; Turkey, 10th August. These are taken from the *Times* of 11th inst., and will be useful for reference.

The Delivery of Particulars on Sales.

IN A letter to the *Times* of 30th July, Sir WILLIAM BULL called attention to the expense occasioned by the continuance of the delivery of particulars under section 4 of the Finance Act, 1910, and to the unsuccessful attempt he made in the House of Commons to procure the repeal of the part of the section relating to the I.V.D. stamp. Until the passing of the Finance Act of this year, namely, on 4th August, all the provisions of the Act of 1910 remained in force, and as between vendors and purchasers the procuring of form I.V.D. (G.) was properly insisted on. But it would seem that the passing of the new Act has altered this. The Act is not yet issued, but, we believe, clause 49 of the Bill was passed without alteration, and that stops the valuation under section 26 of the Act of 1910, and prevents any further collection of land duties, other than Mineral Rights Duty. But section 4 is not expressly touched. That, however, only requires a transferor on sale, or a lessor, to present particulars "for the purpose of the assessment of duty thereon." Since, however, there

can in future be no assessment of duty, it seems to follow that the obligation to deliver particulars has ceased. But Sir WILLIAM BULL appears to be of a different opinion, and we express the above view with caution.

The Long Vacation.

IN REFERRING recently to the arrangements for Vacation business, we suggested a little more indulgence on the part of the Bench as to what this business may properly include; but such indulgence would hardly meet the objections which have long been current to the undue length of the Vacation, and which, we note, were emphasized in the *Saturday Review* last week in an article entitled, "The Denial of Justice." Our contemporary points out that, save for the county courts, the civil courts of the country will be idle until the middle of October, notwithstanding that a few weeks ago the congestion of the courts was officially reported to be so bad that both Houses of Parliament petitioned the King for the appointment of two additional judges. "Those appointments were promptly made—and now no progress will be made in civil suits for a period of ten weeks." It is also pointed out that the Council of Judges, which, under section 75 of the Judicature Act, 1873, is to be summoned once at least in every year for the purpose, among other things, "of inquiring and examining into any defects which may appear to exist in the system of procedure or the administration of the law," met recently, but without any published result. "Surely," remarks the *Saturday Review*, "a ten weeks' vacation at a time of serious legal congestion is a defect in the system of procedure into which the Council of Judges should have inquired." And the conclusion is: "There is no justification whatever for a legal vacation of more than six weeks. The Courts ought to re-assemble in the middle of September."

Modern Changes in the Long Vacation.

COMPARED WITH some reformers—and, indeed, with the greatest reformer of all—the Saturday Reviewer is, of course, moderate. BENTHAM characterized the Long Vacation as a device to enable "the pre-eminently learned few" to gain at once the maximum of fees and the maximum of leisure. In accordance with the maxim, "When sleeps injustice, then may justice too," he would have made legal redress as continuous as medical aid. "If parturition could have been bid to wait, or a hæmorrhage to stop flowing, from Trinity Term to Michaelmas, surgeons, as well as lawyers, might have had the Long Vacation." The subject was very fully discussed in a paper read by the late Mr. THOMAS RAWLE at the Liverpool meeting of the Law Society in 1895 (39 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 831), from which our quotations are taken. And, coming to later times, Mr. RAWLE summarized the various efforts which had been made by the Society to shorten the Vacation. A change in the Vacation was made in 1883, and something under a fortnight was saved by making it run from 12th August to 24th October. About a quarter of a century later—in 1907—the Council of Judges decided to alter the dates so that it should run from 1st August to 12th October, and the change was made by Order in Council of 1st March in that year. But this is probably not the last word on what was described in the *Times* so long ago as 1879, as an "absurdity and an anachronism."

Company Registrations.

WE HAVE received from Messrs. JORDAN & SONS (Limited) a report and tables of company registrations for the first six months of the present year. These shew a total of 878 public and 5,537 private companies, with aggregate capitals of over 290 millions (public) and nearly 160 millions (private). This, it is said, surpasses the wonderful record of the second half of 1919:—

> "The impetus from 1919 gathered greater force throughout the first three months of 1920, and the launching of companies assumed tremendous proportions in March, but the increase in the rate of the capital duty from 5s. to the onerous figure of £1 per £100, which came into force on 20th April, and the rise in the bank rate to 7 per cent. added to the uncertainties as to the additional burdens on business threatened by the Government, applied a check, the severity of which may be measured by the fact that in the first quarter the authorized capital amounted to over £21,000,000 per week, while in the latter portion of the period the average was under £11,000,000. The classes that shew the largest increases are textiles and shipping. The former is over 90 millions above the 1919 figures and the latter is over 43½ millions in excess. The principal decreases are in engineers, £4,243,000; insurance, £5,804,000; mines, £5,863,000; motors, £5,819,000; and oil, £3,994,000."

To shew the magnitude of the business affected, or sought to be affected, it may be mentioned that there were some eighty companies registered with a capital of over a million, the largest being Shipbuilding and Associated Industries, with a capital of 20 million. We have also received the statement of the Stock Exchange Gazette (12th August) for July, and this shews that 758 companies were registered in that month, with an aggregate capital of 26½ million. Here again we find a reference to the registrations in March, which were nearly double those in July, while the total capitalization was about five times July's aggregate. Our contemporary suggests a little arithmetical problem for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to test his net gain—or loss—by the quadrupling of capital duty.

A Gift Not Void for Remoteness.

IN CONNECTION with the subject of gifts void for remoteness, a case in the current volume of the Irish Reports is of interest: see *Davy* v. *Clarke* (1920, 1 I. R. 137). There was a devise of land to a devisee for life, "and after his death to any son or sons . . . as he shall deem most deserving, and attaining the age of twenty-five years." The testator died in 1881, and the devisee entered into possession. The devisee then had, in 1881, three sons living. One son died. The devisee made his will in 1918, and in professed exercise of the power of appointment given him by the will of the original testator, appointed and devised the land to his two surviving sons. It was held by Mr. Justice POWELL that the appointment was valid. The power was a special power of appointment, the estate of the appointees vested immediately on the death of the appointor, the donee of the power and the objects of the power were all living at the time of its creation, and both the sons of the devisee (the objects of the power) had attained the age of twenty-five when the power took effect. Although the appointment was in this case held valid, the litigation produced by the doubt of its validity might have been prevented had some such legislative enactment as has already been referred to been in existence (19th June, p. 581).

Part 1 of the Law of Property Bill.

I.

PART I. of the Law of Property Bill is headed "Assimilation and Amendment of the Law of Real and Personal Estate." It has been held over, pending further consideration of its provisions, but there appears to be no intention of dropping it, and indeed the Lord Chancellor only consented to its deletion from the Bill with a view to enabling unanimity, as far as possible, to be arrived at. It may be useful if we reproduce here from *Hansard* what was said by the Lord Chancellor in reference to Lord CAVE'S motion, and Lord CAVE'S reply:—

> "The Lord Chancellor (Lord BIRKENHEAD): My lords, in moving that the House go into Committee on this Bill it might, perhaps, be convenient that I should make some observations on the subject of an amendment standing in the name of my noble and learned friend Viscount CAVE, to omit Part I. of the Bill. I have had the advantage of having had conversations with him, and the points which he has raised, and which he would have put before your lordships, have been dealt with by the Joint Committee which was appointed for the purpose. Yet the fortunes of the Bill and its usefulness depend on attaining the maximum degree of unanimity possible in the profession, and the authority of the noble Viscount is known to all of us. After discussing the matter with him I have decided to take the course of assenting to the amendment which stands in his name, with the clearly understood and express purpose of having further discussions with him in the in-

terval with the object of seeing what is the maximum degree of agreement we are able to obtain. I hope we shall be able to reach a degree of common view which will enable the proposals in the Bill to become law.

"Viscount CAVE: My lords, I have heard with great pleasure the statement of the Lord Chancellor. It will be a great pity if, on matters of this kind, there should be a difference among those who are conversant with the law on the subject, and as he has been good enough to suggest a course which is satisfactory to me and those who agree with me, we will do our utmost to arrive at some agreement with the Lord Chancellor and those who agree with him."

Then, in the course of the short discussion on the motion to delete Part I., in which Lord HALDANE, Lord BUCKMASTER and Lord MUIR MACKENZIE took part, the Lord Chancellor said:—

"I have not assented to this proposal with the desire to give the impression to anyone that I should be prepared to go on with the Bill if Part I. disappeared, but it is in the hope that discussions with the very able gentlemen with whom Lord CAVE has been co-operating may enable us to obtain a degree of agreement which, at the present moment, does not exist. It is with that feeling, and with that hope, that I assented to the proposal."

And finally Lord CAVE said:—

"The Committee say very frankly in their report that they have not gone into principles but only dealt with details, and therefore this is the first opportunity which I have had of bringing the matter before the House in any workable form. I can only say that I appreciate what has been said by noble lords in expressing regret that the matter is to be postponed, but I shall be only too glad to do what I can to co-operate with them and the Lord Chancellor in endeavouring to agree upon some form of Part I. which will be acceptable to the profession as a whole."

The objection that the Joint Committee in their report did not deal with principles is one that we ourselves made when their report was issued (10th July, *ante*, p. 631). Presumably the Committee thought it sufficient to accept the principles of the scheme for placing the Law of Real Property on a new basis incorporated in Part I., and to deal only with amendments in detail of the other parts of the Bill. But the course which has been taken enables attention to be concentrated for the time upon Part I., and we propose to review its proposals more carefully than we were able to do when they were first published, and when comment had to extend, more or less, to the other parts of the Bill. We also, as we said last week, have had the advantages of seeing the Memorandum, in which Mr. BENN has criticized Part I., and we may not be far wrong in assuming that this Memorandum presents the case against Part I. as forcibly as is practicable. It may be possible for us to suggest some answers to his objections, so as to lay the case both for and against Part I. before our readers in a way which will enable judgment to be passed upon it.

In such a review it would not be right to treat the present Bill as the first attempt to reform the system of transfer of land by private conveyancing. The genesis of the present Bill—we refer only to Part I.—is to be found in the Conveyancing Bill of 1896, which was drafted for the Law Society by the late Mr. E. P. WOLSTENHOLME, assisted by Mr. B. L. CHERRY; the proposals of that Bill received somewhat different form in Lord HALDANE'S Conveyancing Bill, which finally became part of the Real Property and Conveyancing Bill of 1914; and now their form has been varied in the present Bill, though, we think, it will be found that the present Bill is more akin to Mr. WOLSTENHOLME'S than to Lord HALDANE'S. The object of Mr. WOLSTENHOLME'S Bill—the Bill, with the explanatory Memorandum is printed as an appendix to CHERRY and MARIGOLD'S Land Transfer Acts—was "to make the title to land approximate as nearly as circumstances permit to the title to stock, and to obtain the same advantages as would be secured under as good a system of registration of title as may be devised, without the disadvantages incidental to a register of owners." The Memorandum to Lord HALDANE'S Bill stated more shortly that its object was "to facilitate the transfer of land." The scope of the present Bill does not admit of being stated so concisely, but one of its chief objects is to facilitate the transfer of land, though it does a great deal beside this, and its Memorandum claims that "it will effect a greater simplification in the practice of conveyancing, without, however, destroying the power to settle land, than any measure hitherto proposed."

One point—and it is a fundamental point—all three measures have in common. They cut down the estates which are to rank as proprietary estates to the fee simple and a term of years absolute, though the extent of these estates and the nomenclature differs. WOLSTENHOLME'S Bill included equitable fees simple and terms; Lord HALDANE'S Bill introduced the term "proprietary estate"; the present Bill is based on the time-honoured distinction between legal and equitable estates—a distinction which the Judicature Acts, notwithstanding their fusion of law and equity, failed to shake. But, of course, the main feature of the present Bill is the additional importance it gives to the legal fee simple and the legal term of years, and the curtain with which it hides all other interests—of course, we do not refer to easements and the other excepted interests—from view. It is against these "curtain provisions" that Mr. BENN primarily directs his criticism.

(To be continued.)

The Statutory Tenancy Under the Rent Restriction Act, 1920.

III.—FORMATION OF THE STATUTORY TENANCY.

WE saw in our article last week that a new statutory relationship, appropriately called a statutory tenancy, and amounting to a "constructive contract" between the owner and the occupier, arises in the case of certain premises immediately on the passing of the Rent Restriction Act, 1920. We say "immediately" advisedly. For the Act imposes on the landlord certain restrictions of his rights, *e.g.*, the right to give a "notice to quit" and recover possession of his premises, and this restriction operates immediately from the date when the statute comes in force. But the statute also imposes a further restriction of the landlord's power, namely, his right to ask for an increased rent upon the termination of the tenancy, and the existence of this restriction has somewhat obscured the real character of the new statutory relationship. We will, therefore, explain first what, we conceive, is the precise effect of the statute on the subsisting tenancy of any premises to which it relates.

That effect, as we understand it, is this: There are two great classes of premises to which the Act applies—those already let when the statute came into force, and those not then let but becoming let subsequently. In the former case the premises at once become subject to new statutory rights and duties on the part of the landlord and the tenant. In the latter case the premises only become subject to these new rights and duties if and when the owner lets them. He need not do so; he may sell the premises. But in that case the purchaser, if he lets them, can only do so subject to the statutory obligations and restrictions. Again, the owner, if the premises happen to be vacant, might try another plan. He might sell the premises to a would-be occupier, subject to a mortgage, and arrange with the purchaser-mortgagor that the latter is to go into possession. In such a case there is no "letting" of the premises, and therefore the provisions of the statute, as regards rent distinguished from mortgage interest, would have no application. But in the normal case the premises within the Act are already let, and so the statute applies at once. The old tenancy becomes automatically converted into a statutory tenancy.

But, although the old tenancy has gone and has been replaced by a statutory tenancy, this does not necessarily mean that all the provisions of the statute are at once operative. On the contrary, exactly one-half of them are not, namely, those which confer on the landlord the power to raise his rent. On the other hand, all the restrictive provisions do operate at once, *i.e.*, the landlord is at once prohibited from obtaining ejectment or levying distress (sections 5 and 6), except in the mode and under the conditions prescribed by the statute.

The fact that the new statutory tenancy comes into existence *at once* is obscured by a provision which at first sight seems to have a contrary effect; indeed, it at first misled ourselves. For section 3 (i) is in the following terms:—

> "Nothing in this Act shall be taken to authorize any increase of rent except in respect of a period during which, but for this Act, the landlord would be entitled to obtain possession, or any increase in the rate of interest on a mortgage except in respect of a period during which, but for this Act, the security could be enforced."

The words italicised make it clear that before the landlord can exercise his statutory right of raising the rent he must be entitled to the immediate possession of the premises, *i.e.*, the tenancy must have terminated at common law either by expiry of its term, or by surrender, or by forfeiture. In the case of a lease not expiring until after 24th June, 1923 (when the Act comes to an end), the landlord can never be entitled to common law possession in the absence of surrender, forfeiture, or some other means by which the term passes into his hand. In such case, then, the landlord will never be entitled to raise the rent or to obtain possession. In such case, accordingly, it is tempting to say that the statute has not yet applied to such premises, and will not do so until some future event (if ever) arises to terminate the tenancy.

But that, we think, is a wrong way of interpreting the relationship. In every case of premises subject to the Act the statute does apply, or the statutory tenancy does arise at once, *i.e.*, the landlord's future rights are restricted in the way set out in the statute. But since the Act is a restrictive Act, cutting down the landlord's powers, and not an enabling statute, the restrictions (although already in force by law) will not in fact operate until a condition of things arises in which the landlord could have exercised his powers but for the statutory restrictions. This, we think, is the correct way of looking at the statute. The matter is not purely verbal and technical, for upon it turns the question whether "double rent" can be claimed by the landlord in the case of a tenant holding over after notice to quit: *Crook* v. *Whitbread* (1919, 121 L. T. 278). If the old tenancy has not been converted into a new statutory tenancy by the passing of the statute, then a tenant "holding over" is a trespasser and liable for "double rent," although his rent cannot be raised nor can he be ejected except as the statute provides. But if the old tenancy has been converted into a statutory tenancy, then the tenant is a statutory tenant when he "holds over," and has committed no trespass for which the landlord can claim the old statutory penalty of double rent. But we discussed this matter at some length in our first article and need not further refer to it here.

If it be conceded that the statutory tenancy comes into existence at once, but that the landlord cannot claim any increase of rent until he is by common law entitled to the possession of the premises—as seems to follow from the wording of section 3 (1) quoted above—the next point, and one of great practical importance to decide, is the procedure imposed by the statute on a landlord who desires to exercise his statutory right of raising the rent. It seems clear that he must do two things:—

(1) Acquire a common law right to the possession of his premises so as to be entitled to demand a new rental, and

(2) Give notice of the increased rent (4 weeks' notice) in the manner prescribed by the statute (First Schedule).

But some persons have been of opinion that the second step alone is necessary in the case of weekly, fortnightly, or monthly tenancies, since a four weeks' notice is sufficient to terminate each of those respective kinds of tenancy. Of course, in the case of a quarterly or annual tenancy, no notice to increase the rent is effective unless and until the expiry of the tenancy after the proper legal notice. In such cases, it is clear, two separate notices must be served—

(1) A notice to quit expiring on the first date on which the landlord could at common law demand possession, and

(2) A statutory four weeks' notice of increased rent, following the form in the schedule, and expiring on the same day as the notice to quit.

It will, no doubt, be wisest to give these two notices in every case, including that of weekly, fortnightly, monthly tenancies, and tenancies at will or on sufferance. Failing such notice to quit, it is quite possible that express agreement on the part of the tenant to the course taken by the landlord, or even the mere payment of the increased rent by him, would be sufficient to amount to a "novation," or at least to a "waiver" on the tenant's part; we, indeed, think that the Courts would so hold; but it is best not to rely on what is, after all, an uncertain interpretation of the Act. It is just as easy to give two notices as to give one. And, therefore, it is safer to serve both.

Before closing this article we must refer to a subtlety which has arisen in the construction of this Act. It will be seen that section 3 (1), quoted above, only authorizes the increase of rent "in respect of a period during which, but for this Act, the landlord would be entitled to obtain possession." In the case of premises which come under this Act for the first time, the words italicised create no difficulty. But what about premises which came under the 1915 and later statutes, now repealed by the present Act? In the case of a house with rental of only £20, what is the position of a landlord who desires to raise the rent? He can do so in respect of a period during which he was entitled to but for this Act. But, on the literal construction of the Act, there is no such period, for under the Act of 1915 he was not entitled to possession, and that Act would be law still but for this Act, which repeals it and its restrictions. It would, therefore, seem that in the case of such houses the landlord can never raise the rent—a result certainly never contemplated by the Legislature. Clearly, the words "but for this Act" cannot be construed literally. They really mean "but for this Act and the earlier Acts which it repeals in order to extend them," and no doubt the Court would so interpret them. But the draftsman's *lacuna* is a very awkward one.

(To be continued.)

Reviews.

The German Treaty.

THE GERMAN TREATY TEXT, WITH INTRODUCTION BY LORD ROBERT CECIL, PREFACE BY H. W. V. TEMPERLEY, AND A BRIEF COMMENTARY. Published under the auspices of the Institute of International Affairs. Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press; Hodder & Stoughton. 5s. net.

The bulk of this volume consists of the text of the Treaty between the Allied Powers and Germany. The Introductory Note by Lord Robert Cecil and the Preface by Mr. Temperley are very brief, but Lord Robert, as might be anticipated, emphasizes the importance of the Covenant of the League of Nations as an essential part of the Treaty. "No European reconstruction is possible except by the settled and organized application of the principles of national altruism and international co-operation. For this peace is the first essential; and the second is the power of re-writing those portions of the Treaty which are inconsistent with justice and expediency. The machinery of the Covenant enables both of those objects to be carried out." Of course, the Treaty is, in theory, the carrying into execution of the executory agreement based on the "Fourteen Points," on the faith of which the war was ended. And practice is, it may be hoped, shaping the Treaty in this direction by the revision which necessity drives on, though statesmen deny it. The text of the Treaty is presented in very convenient form, and much useful matter is given in the appendices to assist the study of it, including President WILSON'S "Fourteen Points" speech of 8th January, 1918, and his further speech of 11th February, 1918, and several maps, including a general map to illustrate the Treaty. And, in addition to a short commentary on the Treaty, there is the official commentary on the League of Nations Covenant. Altogether the volume is a very complete and useful edition of the Treaty.

Books of the Week.

Income Tax.—All the 1920 Budget Changes—Income Tax and Super Tax, 1842-1921—Tabular Review. Third Edition. Oliver & Boyd. 1s. net.

Rent Restriction.—The Tenants' Emergency Charter (Houses, Shops, &c.) under the Rent Restriction Act, 1920. Fifth Edition. Incorporating the Effects of all the Decisions of the Courts up to date. Oliver & Boyd. 2s. net.

The Law of Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions, including "The Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920" (enacted July 2nd), and other Emergency Legislation and Statutes Repealed Applicable to Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions. By JOHN DUNCAN, M.A. (Lond.), &c., Barrister-at-Law. Estates Gazette (Limited).

Correspondence.

Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act.

[*To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter.*]

Sir,—I have to thank you for dealing with the point raised in my previous letter regarding the effect of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Acts. I venture to doubt, however, whether the short answer which you suggest quite disposes of the question.

In the case of a mortgage to which the Emergency Acts apply the mortgagee cannot foreclose or realise his security "except after such application to such court and such notice" as the rules or directions under the Acts provide. That is to say, the Acts prevent the enforcement of the security without the leave of the Court.

So long as the Emergency Acts remain in force it must be assumed that circumstances may exist under which the Court would not—quite apart from the provisions of the Increase of Rent, &c., Acts—have allowed the mortgagee to foreclose or realise his security; and it would appear that, if such circumstances did exist, the security would not be one which, but for the Act of 1920, could be enforced.

I do not think that the legislature intended such mortgagees to be exempt from the increases of interest permitted by the last-mentioned Act, but, in face of the actual terms of section 3, it seems to me difficult to say that the mortgagee is in a position to enforce his security unless the circumstances are such that, but for the Act of 1920, the Court would have allowed him to foreclose or sell. It might even, I think, be contended that he is not really in a position to enforce the security until he has actually obtained the leave of the Court on an application under the Emergency Acts.

H. Reason Pyke.

Bankside, Upper Tooting Park, London, S.W. 17.
August 7.

[We quite admit the force of Dr. Pyke's reasoning, and are obliged to him for putting the point so clearly. The question is whether, in deference to this reasoning, the Act is to be nullified, or whether the Courts—*i.e.*, the County Courts under the unlimited jurisdiction conferred by section 17 (2) of the Act—will allow it to operate.—Ed. *S.J.*]

CASES OF THE WEEK.

Before the Vacation Judge.

JACKSON *v.* **WEBSTER.** 1st August.

Practice—System of Linked Judges—Motion for Judgment—Notice of Motion—Name of Judge to Whom Action Assigned—Non-appearing Defendant.

Where a motion states that the Court will be moved before the judge to whom the action is assigned on a day named, if the motion is for a final order, as distinguished from an interlocutory order, the motion must be heard before that judge, and the judge with whom that judge is "linked" has no jurisdiction to deal with the motion.

In an action assigned to Russell, J., with whom Sargant, J., was "linked," the plaintiff moved before Sargant, J., for judgment in default of appearance, and the notice of motion set out that the motion would be moved before Russell, J. Under the system of "linked judges" in the Chancery Division, Sargant, J., was hearing motions in actions assigned to Russell, J., or to himself. The motion coming on for hearing, the question was raised whether the notice of motion was sufficient to give Sargant, J., jurisdiction. In the Annual Practice (1920, p. 897), citing *Re Madame Romney (Limited)* (1915, W. N. 389), it is stated that "the notice of motion is sufficient if it states that the Court will be moved before the judge to whom the action is assigned, though in fact the motion comes on before the judge to whom, under the present C.D. system, he is linked, and though defendant does not appear." Sargant, J., held that a notice of motion for judgment, as distinguished from an interlocutory order, as was the order in the case above cited, must state the name of the judge who was actually sitting to hear motions on the day named in the notice, and that the matter must therefore be mentioned to the vacation judge. A fresh notice of motion was taken out by the plaintiff, the motion stating that the motion would be moved before Rowlatt, J. The case being called on, counsel in support of the motion stated the facts, and said that the matter was in order, and but for the reason stated Sargant, J., said he would have made the order as asked. No one appeared for the defendant.

Rowlatt, J.—You may take your order.—Counsel, for the plaintiff. *Fawcus.* Solicitors, *Lewis & Sons.*

[Reported by Erskine Reid, Barrister-at-Law.]

CASES OF LAST SITTINGS.

House of Lords.

LORD ADVOCATE (on behalf of the Inland Revenue Commissioners of Inland Revenue) v. JAFFREY AND ANOTHER. 21st and 22nd June; 16th July.

Succession Duty—Husband and Wife—Voluntary Deed of Separation—Husband Deserts Wife and Lives Abroad—Whether Acquisition of Independent Domicile by Wife Stante Matrimonio.

Two persons, both of original Scotch domicile, married. Soon afterwards the husband became addicted to drink and maltreated his wife. They executed a voluntary deed of separation, and the husband went to Australia, where he lived at Brisbane from 1899 to January, 1918, when he died. All that time the wife continued to live on in Scotland, and there was no communication between the spouses. In 1902 the husband contracted a bigamous marriage in Australia, but it was not for some years that the wife knew of it. In 1915 she instituted proceedings against her husband on the ground of desertion and adultery, but she died on 9th September, 1915, when the service on the husband of the summons had not been effected.

In a question of liability of the wife's estate to succession duty, raised by an action by the trustees of the wife's estate for a declaration that succession duty was not payable, it was held by the Scotch Courts that, although the husband had deserted his wife in the popular if not in the sense of the Scots Act, 1573, c. 55, the wife was never in a position to acquire a domicile independent of that of her husband; that the husband was domiciled in Queensland, and that her domicile was therefore in Queensland at the date of her death. The Lord Advocate appealed.

Held, after consideration, that the proper course was to follow the well-established rule that the domicile of a husband and wife, undivorced and unseparated, was one and the same, and therefore the decision appealed from must be upheld.

Decision of the First Division of the Court of Session (*sitting as the Court of Exchequer in Scotland*) (*reported* 56 *Sc. L. R.* 55) *affirmed.*

Appeal by the Lord Advocate from an interlocutor of the Court of Session in an action at the instance of the respondents, the trustees acting under the trust disposition and settlement of the late Mrs. Isabella Henderson Watson or Mackinnon against the appellant for and on behalf of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. The facts sufficiently appear from the head note.

Lord Haldane, in giving judgment, said the question was whether Mrs. Mackinnon at the time of her death was domiciled in Queensland, and the liability of the estate in respect of legacy and succession duties depended on the answer to that question. The inquiry fell under two heads: (1) Had Robert Mackinnon, the husband of the testatrix, acquired, at the date of her death, a domicile in Queensland? (2) If he had, was the testatrix, as his wife, also domiciled in Queensland? His lordship referred to the facts as set out in the head note. The Lord Ordinary (Lord Ormidale) found that having regard to his long-continued residence in Queensland the husband had acquired a domicile of choice in Queensland at the date of his wifes' death. The judges of the First Division concurred with the Lord Ordinary. There remained the question whether the testatrix, as his wife, shared his domicile in Queensland. On this point the judges of the Court of Session were equally divided. The Lord Ordinary in the first instance, and Lord Mackenzie in the Inner House, took the view that, under the special circumstances of this case, the ordinary rule that the domicile of the wife was that of the husband had no application, and that she retained her Scottish domicile. But the majority of the judges held that there were no circumstances in the present case sufficient to exclude the application of the rule. The appellants relied upon what was said by Lord Cranworth in *Dolphin* v. *Robins* (1859, 3 Macq. 563, and 7 H. L. C. 590), and Sir Robert Phillimore's decision in *La Sueur* v. *La Sueur* (1876, 7. P. D. 139). In the latter case Sir Robert Phillimore expressed the opinion that desertion by the husband would entitle the wife, without a decree of judicial separation, to choose a new domicile for herself. He was unable to agree with that decision. His view was in accordance with the opinion of Lord Cranworth in *Dolphin* v. *Robins* (*supra*). There was no desertion by the husband either in going to Australia, which was at the instance of his wife, or in his remaining there, which was by her desire. Undoubtedly his bigamous marriage would have enabled the wife, if she had sued in the proper tribunal, to obtain a decree of judicial separation. But there were the strongest reasons for saying that, however clear the facts might be, that the wife was not bound to adhere. This could not of itself suffice to prevent the wife's domicile being that of her husband. That questions of succession should depend upon an inquiry after the death of the parties into their conduct would be dangerous to the last degree. In his opinion the appeal failed.

Lords Finlay, Cave, Dunedin and Shaw of Dunfermline, gave judgments to the like effect, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed.—Counsel, for the appellants, *The Lord Advocate* (*T. B. Morison*, K.C.) and *R. C. Henderson*; for the respondents, *Alexander Moncrieff*, K.C., and *T. M. Cooper*. Solicitors, *H. Bertram Cox*, C.B., and *Stair A. Gillon*, solicitors respectively for English and Scottish Board of Revenue; *Botterell & Roche*, for *Macpherson & Mackay*, W.S., Edinburgh, and *Morice & Wilson*, Advocates, Aberdeen.

[Reported by Erskine Reid, Barrister-at-Law.]

Court of Appeal.

OWNERS OF THE S.S. "LORD" v. NEWSUM & SONS & CO. (LIM.).
No. 2. 1st, 26th July.

PRACTICE—APPEAL—CASE STATED BY AN ARBITRATOR—ARBITRATOR DESIRING CASE TO GO BACK IN ONE EVENT—CONSULTATIVE JURISDICTION OF COURT—ARBITRATION ACT, 1889 (52 & 53 VICT. c. 49), ss. 7, 19.

In a special case stated for the opinion of the High Court, the arbitrator, after stating certain findings of fact and conclusions of law, proceeded: "The question for the opinion of the Court is whether, upon the true construction of the charter-party, and the facts as stated by me, the decisions at which I have arrived are correct in law? If they be correct, my award is to stand, but if incorrect in any particular, I desire that the award may be referred back to me for re-assessment of the damages due in accordance with the decision of the Court." A preliminary objection was taken to the hearing of the appeal, on the ground that the case stated was not a final award under section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, but was a case stated for the opinion of the Court under section 19. The arbitrator did not state under which section he intended to proceed.

Held (Scrutton, L.J., *dissenting*), *that no appeal lay, as the arbitrator had not stated the case so that, whichever way the question was answered, the rights of the parties would have been finally determined, but had reserved the question of damages for himself in the event of the question being answered in a particular way, the case not being in the form of a special case within section 7. It was a special case stated under section 19 of the Act of 1889, and the jurisdiction of the Court was consultative only, and was not subject to appeal.*

The Holland Steamship case (1906, 23 *T. L. R.* 59) followed.

Appeal by the shipowners from a judgment of Bailhache, J. (reported 1920, 1 K. B. 846), upon a clause in a charter-party. A preliminary objection was taken by the charterers that no appeal would lie because the special case as stated was not a final award, but a case stated for the opinion of the Court under section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1889. The material clause in the special case is set out in the head note. *Cur. adv. vult.*

BANKES, L.J., said it was well-settled law that no appeal lay to this Court if the special case was one stated under section 19. The arbitrator had not stated on the face of the special case under which section he intended to proceed. It was necessary therefore to arrive at a conclusion from the language used by him. If by the language used it appeared that the arbitrator had sufficiently indicated that the matter must go back to him after the Court had expressed its opinion, in order that he might give his final opinion upon it, then the special case was one stated under section 19, and no appeal would lie; *Re Holland Steamship Co.* and *Bristol Steam, &c., Co.* (23 T. L. R. 59) was a case in point. There the arbitrators stated their award, deciding two points, and went on to say that if the Court held that the two points were correctly decided, then the award was to stand, but if the Court should be of opinion that either point was wrongly decided, then the matter "is to be remitted to us to give effect to the true construction of the contracts in our interim and final awards." In arriving at a decision the Court laid no stress upon the particular language in which the arbitrators expressed their intention to have the case sent back to them in the event of the Court disagreeing with their findings. What appeared to have impressed the Court was that the special case did not state the question for the opinion of the Court in such a way that, whichever way the Court answered that question, the award would be final. This case was indistinguishable from that of the *Holland Steamship case*. The arbitrator here had come to no decision in reference to the damages which might become payable in the event of the Court not accepting the decision to which he had come, but he desired that the award might be referred back to him for re-assessment of the damages due in accordance with the decision of the Court if they disagreed with his decision. The only distinction which could be drawn between the present case and the *Holland Steamship case* was that in the one the arbitrator desired that the award might be referred back, and in the other the arbitrator stated that the matter was to be referred back. In his opinion, both expressions should be construed as evincing the same intention—to retain seisin of the case; but whether that view was correct or not, he thought that any drawing of fine distinctions between the decisions by this Court would only add to the uncertainty and confusion produced by the present state of the law on this point. In *Shrubrook* v. *Tufnell* (1851, 9 Q. B. Div. 621) the point now under discussion was not raised. Until the law was altered, of which there was apparently some probability, arbitrators would be well advised, when stating a special case, to state on the face of the case under which section it was intended to be stated. The objection prevailed, and the appeal would be dismissed with costs.

WARRINGTON, L.J., gave judgment to the like effect.

SCRUTTON, L.J., dissented. He thought the arbitrator had expressed his final opinion. It was said that for a case to be final the award must provide for every contingency, so that, whatever view the Court took of the questions asked, the award finally determined the matter. That seemed inconsistent with *Shubrook's case* (*supra*). The point in the present case had no merits, for if it succeeded the case must go back to the arbitrator to make a final award, and if in that he stated that he followed the opinion of the Court, all the appeals would follow which the objection was intended to avoid. The respondents, however, desired the point taken. It failed, in his opinion, and they should pay the costs occasioned by taking it, and the appeal should proceed.—COUNSEL, for the shipowners, *Neilson*, K.C., and *Jowitt*; for the charterers, *MacKinnon*, K.C., and *Le Quesne*. SOLICITORS, *Botterell & Roche*; *Thomas Cooper & Co.*, for *Hill, Dickinson, & Co.*, Liverpool.

[Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

High Court—Chancery Division.

***Re* DAVIDSON'S PATENT. *Re* GASKIN'S PATENT.** Sargant, J. 30th July.

PATENT—PRACTICE—PATENTS AND DESIGNS ACT, 1919 (9 & 10 GEO. 5. c. 30), s. 7.

Applications under section 7 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1919, should generally be made, like those under the previous practice, quite a short time before the expiration of the patent.

These were both applications made a long time before the expiration of the patents for the prolongation of the terms of the patents under section 7 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1919, and in each case the comptroller of patents took objection that the question of extension ought not to be dealt with shortly before the expiration of the patents.

SARGANT, J., in the course of a considered judgment, after stating the facts, said: As a general rule, at least, applications under section 7 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1919, should, like those under the previous practice, be made quite a short time before the expiration of the patents, and I do not find in either of these cases any special circumstances justifying a departure from this general rule. The cases in which such a departure will be justified are probably very rare. But as these applications are the first of the kind, and the practice has not so far been settled, I do not dismiss them, but merely direct them to stand over generally to a date nearer to the time for the expiration of the patents.—COUNSEL, *Sir Arthur Colefax*, K.C.; *Byrne Moritz*. SOLICITORS, *George Beloe Ellis; Baddeleys, and Co.; Solicitor to the Board of Trade.*

[Reported by LEONARD MAY, Barrister-at-Law.]

***Re* HALE'S PATENT.** Sargant, J. 23rd July.

PATENT—USER BY THE CROWN—DISPUTE—PATENTS AND DESIGNS ACT, 1919 (9 & 10 GEO. 5, c. 80), ss. 8 AND 21.

The jurisdiction under section 8 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1919, can be exercised by any judge of the High Court, and is not vested solely in the judge to whom patent matters are specially assigned.

Where an Act of Parliament alters a matter of procedure, the new procedure applies to cases where rights have previously arisen; but where the Act alters the rights of the parties, matters which had taken place before the Act are to be dealt with in accordance with the previously existing law, and matters which took place after the Act are to be dealt with under the Act.

This case raised two important questions as to the effect of the Patents and Designs Act, 1919. The first was whether the expression "the court" in section 8 of that Act meant the High Court of Justice, or the judge having special jurisdiction in respect of patents under the Patents and Designs Act, 1907. The second was whether the Act of 1919 applied in respect of matters which occurred before the date when that Act came into operation if the dispute about them took place after that date of operation. This was a motion by the patentee for directions as to what was to be done in a case where the Government had used a patent before the 1919 Act was passed, but the dispute had arisen after the Act came into force. The formation of the Act was referred to by the patentee, and also the fact that sections were said to be "substituted" for sections of the principal Act, and the fact that section 8 of the Act was retrospective, and entitled the applicant to have his case heard by the High Court instead of the tribunal under the 1907 Act. For the Crown it was suggested that, at any rate, the authority to the King's printer given by section 21, to send out copies of the 1907 Act with the substituted sections of the 1919 Act, could not have the effect of making the 1919 Act retrospective.

SARGANT, J., after stating the facts, said the parties in this case came to an agreement that the jurisdiction under section 8 of the Patents and Designs Act, 1919, can be exercised by any judge of the High Court, and is not vested solely in the judge to whom patent matters are specially assigned; and I agree with this view. I am now that judge, and have therefore jurisdiction, whether as the patent judge or as a judge of the High Court; but the matter may be important when a case like this comes before some other judge of the High Court. In my opinion, there is jurisdiction in all the judges of the High Court under this section. On the other and the more important question, in my judgment, where an Act alters a matter of procedure, the new procedure applies to cases where rights have previously arisen. In this case, however, the Act of 1919 has not only altered the tribunal to which matters under section 8 have to be referred, but has also altered the rights of the parties, both patentee and the Crown; and as to matters which had taken place before the new Act came into operation, section 8 does not apply, but they are to be dealt with in accordance with the previously existing law; whereas those matters which occurred after the time when the Act of 1919 came into operation are to be dealt with under that Act. Accordingly, this application must be dismissed.—COUNSEL, *Kerly*, K.C., and *Robert Frost*; *Sir Gordon Hewart*, A.-G., and *J. Austen Cartmell*; *W. Trevor Watson*; *James Whitehead*. SOLICITORS, *Badham, Comins, & Sloman*; *The Treasury Solicitor.*

[Reported by LEONARD MAY, Barrister-at-Law.]

JACKSON v. WEBSTER. Sargant, J. 27th July.

PRACTICE—LINKED JUDGES—NOTICE OF MOTION—MOTION FOR JUDGMENT—NON-APPEARANCE OF DEFENDANT—NAME OF JUDGE TO WHOM ACTION ASSIGNED.

A notice of motion for judgment, unlike a notice of motion for an interlocutory order in the action, must state the name of the judge who is actually sitting to hear motions for judgment on the day named in the notice, and is not sufficient if it merely states the name of the "linked" judge where the defendant does not appear.

Re Madame Romney (Limited) (1915, W. N. 389) distinguished.

This was an action for specific performance assigned to Russell, J., with whom Sargant, J., is "linked." The plaintiff moved for judgment before Sargant, J., and the notice of motion stated that the motion would be moved before Russell, J., under the system of linked judges. In the Chancery Division, where Sargant, J., was hearing the motions in actions assigned to himself or to Russell, J., a point arose as to whether the notice was sufficient. At page 897 of the "Annual Practice, 1920," the following note appears: "The notice of motion is sufficient if it states that the Court will be moved before the judge to whom the action is assigned, though in fact the motion comes on before the judge to whom, under the present Chancery Division system, he is linked, and though the defendant does not appear; and in support of that statement the case is cited of *Re Madame Romney (Limited)* (1915, W. N. 389)."

SARGANT, J., after stating the facts, said a notice of motion for judgment, as distinguished from a notice of motion for an interlocutory order, must state the name of the judge who is actually sitting to hear motions on the day named in the notice, and in this case must accordingly now be dealt with by the vacation judge.—COUNSEL, *Fawcus.* SOLICITORS, *Lewis & Sons.*

[Reported by LEONARD MAY Barrister-at-Law.]

Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.

HIGGS v. HIGGS. Duke, P. 2nd June.

MARRIAGE—EVIDENCE—MARRIAGE AT THE CHAPEL OF THE BRITISH FACTORY, PETROGRAD—CERTIFICATE OF AN ENTRY IN REGISTER OF THE DIOCESE OF LONDON AT DOCTORS' COMMONS—4 GEO. 4, C. 67.

Where the parties were married at the Chapel of the British Factory, Petrograd, the Court accepted a certificate of the entry in the register of the diocese of London at Doctors' Commons, to which place particulars of marriages at the Chapel of the British Factory had been sent in accordance with an ancient usage, and such marriages were declared valid by 4 Geo. 4, c. 67.

This was an undefended suit for restitution of conjugal rights by Mrs. Natalie Dmitrievna Higgs against her husband, William Bernard Comber Higgs. Counsel for petitioner stated that the petitioner was born in Russia, and was married to the respondent at the chapel of the British Factory at St. Petersburg (now Petrograd) on 31st January, 1908. She also went through a second ceremony of marriage at the church of the Academy of Art, Nicholaevsky Quay, St. Petersburg. Since 1918 the respondent had refused to live with her. A representative of the Bishop of London's registry produced an entry in the register of the diocese of London at Dean's Court, Doctors' Commons, relating to the marriage solemnized at the chapel of the British Factory, St. Petersburg, and said that particulars of these marriages were sent to the Bishop of London in pursuance of a very ancient usage, which went back before the life of any living person. Counsel referred to 4 Geo. 4, cc. 67 & 91, and said that in 1807 the Russian Government abolished the Factories, but the custom of celebrating marriages in the chapels of the Factories was continued. Such marriages were declared to be valid by 4 Geo. 4, c. 67.

The PRESIDENT accepted the certificate as proof of the marriage, and pronounced a decree of restitution of conjugal rights to be obeyed within fourteen days after service.—COUNSEL, *T. Bucknill.* SOLICITORS, *Morris, Veasey, & Co.*

[Reported by C. G. TALBOT-POXSONBY, Barrister-at-Law.]

BETTON BRIGHT (formerly OUTERBRIDGE, A. M.) v. BETTON BRIGHT (formerly OUTERBRIDGE, R. J. H.). Sir H. Duke, P. 20th May.

DIVORCE—WIFE'S SUIT—"USUAL ORDER FOR WIFE'S COSTS"—SECURITY ORDERED FOR WIFE'S COSTS OF HEARING—NO APPLICATION FOR FURTHER SECURITY—WIFE'S COSTS LIMITED TO AMOUNT SECURED.

Where the Registrar has fixed the amount of the security for the wife's costs of the hearing of the suit, and there is no application for further security,

Held that the usual order for the wife's costs is limited to the amount secured.

The facts of this case sufficiently appear from the judgment.

DUKE, P.—This is a summons for a review of taxation of the wife's costs in a suit where the wife, who was the petitioner, was unsuccessful. The petition was for dissolution of marriage upon allegations of adultery and cruelty. At the trial the learned judge, Mr. Justice Horridge, found against the petitioner on both her grounds of complaint, dismissed the petition, and dealt with costs by a direction which is expressed in the decree in these words, "usual order for wife's costs." The position of the suit as to the wife's costs at the time of the order in question was that, pending the suit, there had been the usual application for payment and security, a taxation of the costs of the petitioner's solicitors to that date, and an order on the respondent to pay the amount of the bill as taxed (£30 13s. 6d.), and to pay into court or give security for the sum of £30, estimated by one of the registrars as sufficient to cover the costs and expenses of the petitioner of, and incidental to, the hearing of the cause. The estimate of the registrar on which this order was based proceeded on the assumption that the cause would be disposed of in one day; as it in fact was. There has been no appeal from the registrar's order as to security, and no application for any increased security for the wife's costs was made, or could reasonably have been made. After the decree the wife's solicitors brought in the bill of their further costs for taxation, the amount of this bill being £40 9s. The registrar before whom the bill came for taxation—Mr. Registrar Barnard—taxed the costs at £30. He held that the petitioner was not entitled upon a decree in the form of that made by Mr. Justice Horridge to recover from the respondent costs in excess of the amount ordered before the hearing to be paid into the court or secured for the wife's costs of hearing. Objection to the taxation is taken by the petitioner on this ground. At the trial the judge gave to the petitioner the usual costs, and it is submitted that the principle upon which the petitioner's bill of costs should be taxed is laid down in the decision in *Palmer* v. *Palmer and Stockley* (1914, P. 116), in which it was decided that the words "the usual costs" mean that the costs are not to be limited as to any part thereof to a previous estimate, but are to be such costs as are ascertained on taxation to be the proper costs to allow in a strict taxation between party and party. The learned registrar points out in his answer to the objection that in *Palmer* v. *Palmer and Stockley* the trial lasted more than one day. Counsel for the wife had applied for and obtained further security, and it had been ordered at the hearing that "the petitioner should pay the respondent her taxed costs, not to exceed the amount ordered to be paid into the court or secured for the wife's of the hearing, together with such further sum as would have been ordered to be paid into court or secured had the duration of the hearing been known at the date of such order." The learned registrar also states that the practice under circumstances of the present case is to tax the wife's costs up the amount secured. For the petitioner reliance was placed upon the decision on the general question given by the Court of Appeal in *Robertson* v. *Robertson* (6 P. D. 116), and upon the judgment of my predecessor, Sir Samuel Evans, in *Palmer* v. *Palmer and Stockley*. This judgment he regarded as a judicial interpretation of the term "usual order for wife's costs," which has attached to it an invariable meaning. There are passages in the judgment in question which appear at first sight to support this contention, but it is at variance with well-known practice in the registry. I have inquired in the registry as to the practice followed since the direction given by Lord Gorell in November, 1908, which is set out in *Palmer* v. *Palmer*, not only in cases like *Palmer* v. *Palmer*, but in cases like the present. The practice is stated comprehensively as follows:—When increase of security is ordered during the hearing, and no special order as to costs subsequently is made, the decree is drawn up in the form prescribed by Lord Gorell, and taxation proceeds in accordance therewith. When security is fixed before the hearing, and no order for increased security is made during the hearing, and the decree gives the wife the usual costs, the practice is to limit the wife's costs upon taxation by the amount ordered before the hearing to be paid in or secured. The only question of principle raised by the present application seems to me to be whether the direction to tax to the unsuccessful petitioner the usual costs of an unsuccessful petitioner, which is in effect the direction given at the trial, is an exercise of the discretion of the Court which has been duly carried out in the registry. The matter cannot properly be dealt with upon a supposition that there is, as regards the wife, one usual order which applies to all the possible events of such causes. The usual order in cases like *Palmer* v. *Palmer*, where during

the hearing the Court has ordered an increase of security, is not, and ought not to be, the usual order in cases like the present, where, before the hearing, the Court has determined what provision by the husband is necessary in order to enable the wife to present her case to the Court and upon that provision being made the cause has been proceeded in due course to a decision. The principles laid down in *Robertson* v. *Robertson* as to the obligations of the husband with regard to the wife's costs and the exercise of the discretion of the Court in making an order for such costs, seem to me to be in no way contravened by the action taken in this case. The learned Judge at the trial dealt with a state of facts, which is of every-day occurrence, by a direction which was perfectly plain, which was not misunderstood by the taxing master, and which has been carried into effect. As to the words of the judgment in *Palmer* v. *Palmer* with regard to "the usual order," which are set out in the notice of objection, and were relied upon in argument for the petitioner, they relate to the usual order in a class of cases in which this is not included, the class, namely, in which the Court has directed at the trial that additional security should be given for the wife's costs, and has afterwards directed that the wife's costs should be taxed and paid. That this is no new view appears from the statement as to the practice in this Division made by Lord Justice Lindley in *Russell* v. *Russell* (1892, P. 152): "On the dismissal of the wife's petition her solicitor usually gets his costs to the amount of the money paid into court by her husband, or to the amount of the bond given by him. But an order to this effect is necessary, and the solicitor cannot without order get any costs either out of the money in court or by having recourse to the bond." The order referred to by Lord Justice Lindley is, of course, the order of the judge at the trial. Only two other things need be said. First, it was recognized in *Robertson* v. *Robertson* that the old rule of the common law, whereby upon marriage the wife's personal property vested in the husband, underlay the practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts and the Divorce Court as to the wife's costs, and in *Otway* v. *Otway* (15 P. D. 12) the Lords Justices pointed out the new considerations which arise in respect of marriages solemnized after the coming into operation of the Married Woman's Property Act, 1882. Secondly, there is to-day, no less than there was in Lord Hannen's time, necessity for constant care lest the safeguards which this court has set up to protect the honest interests of wives involved in litigation in this Division should be used to prevent the access to the court of men of small means, who are entitled to the remedies it can give. All that was said on this subject by Lord Hannen when he decided *Smith* v. *Smith* (7 P. D. 84) in 1882, is matter of common knowledge among those who now administer the jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. The application of the petitioner fails, and must be dismissed. In answer to a request for leave to appeal, if necessary, the President said: No, I should not consider an appeal. The matter is so well settled in the registry that I have no doubt myself what the usual practice of the court is. I do not think it is a case where there is any principle to be determined.—COUNSEL, *Grazebrook*, for petitioner. SOLICITORS, *Cardew, Smith, & Ross.*

[Reported by C. G. TALBOT-PONSONBY, Barrister-at-Law.]

New Orders, &c.

New Statutes.

On 4th August the Royal Assent was given to—
Finance Act, 1920.
County Councils Association Expenses (Amendment) Act, 1920.
Veterinary Surgeons Act (1881) Amendment Act, 1920.
Harbours, Docks and Piers (Temporary Increase of Charges) Act, 1920.
Ecclesiastical Tithe Rentcharge (Rates) Act, 1920.
War Pensions Act, 1920.
Bank Notes (Ireland) Act, 1920.
Public Libraries (Ireland) Act, 1920.
Sheriffs (Ireland) Act, 1920.
Nauru Island Agreement Act, 1920.
Gas Regulation Act 1920.
And to a large number of Provisional Orders, local and private Acts.

On 9th August the Royal Assent was given to—
Overseas Trades (Credits and Insurance) Act, 1920.
Unemployment Insurance Act, 1920.
Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, 1920.
And to several Provisional Orders local and private Acts.

Criminal Procedure—England: Women Jurors.

The Women Jurors' (Criminal Cases) Rules, 1920.

RULES DATED 15TH JULY, 1920, MADE IN PURSUANCE OF SECTION 1 OF THE SEX DISQUALIFICATION REMOVAL ACT, 1919, BY THE RULE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE INDICTMENTS ACT, 1915.

We the Rule Committee, established under Section 2 of the Indictments Act, 1915, hereby make the following Rules:—

1. All jury precepts, warrants, writs, lists and returns required to be issued or made under the Juries Acts, or any of them, shall include all women qualified and liable to serve as jurors, and the jurors' books shall be made up accordingly.

2. All persons qualified and liable to serve as jurors shall be summoned to serve on juries without distinction of sex, but otherwise as heretofore; provided that a husband and wife shall not both be summoned to serve on the same occasion.

3. The number of women appearing on any panel of jurors shall be in the same proportions as near as may be, to the numbers of men appearing thereon as the total number of women is to the total number of men in the jurors' book or other list of jurors from which the panel is drawn.

Provided that it shall be the duty of the Under-Sheriff or other person upon whom is cast the duty of summoning jurors to secure that, wherever possible, there shall not be less than fourteen women on the jury panel.

Provided also that this Rule shall not apply to Grand Juries.

4. On every trial by jury, the jury shall be a jury selected from the panel by ballot in manner prescribed by Section 26 of the Juries Act, 1825; provided that this Rule shall be without prejudice to the power of the Court under Section 17 of the Juries Act 1870, to order that a Special Jury be struck according to the practice then prevailing; provided also that this Rule shall not apply to Grand Juries.

5. Upon every Jury summons served upon a woman there shall appear a notice that she may apply to the Summoning Officer for exemption from attendance as a juror on account of pregnancy or other feminine condition or ailment provided that such application is received by the Summoning Officer within three days of the receipt of the Jury Summons by the applicant.

6. The Under-Sheriff or other person upon whom is cast the duty of forming the Jury Panels may in his discretion exempt from attendance any woman who has been summoned to serve as juror, if he is satisfied by medical certificate or otherwise that on account of pregnancy or some other feminine condition or ailment she is, or will be, unfit to serve.

7. In any criminal case an application under Section 1 (*b*) of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act, 1919, that the jury shall be composed of men only or of women only shall be made in the Court in which such case is depending for trial, and except by leave of such Court at the first sitting thereof.

Provided always that the said Court may in its discretion hear the application at such time as may appear convenient.

8. Written notice of an intention to make an application under Rule 7 shall be given not later than at the first sitting of the Court by or on behalf of the Prosecutor to the Clerk of Assize, Clerk of the Peace or other proper proper officer of the Court as the case may be, and similarly so far as possible, by or on behalf of an accused person to such proper officer of the Court, and to the Prosecutor and upon receipt of such last-mentioned notice it shall be the duty of the said officer of the Court to communicate the effect thereof to the Prosecutor when practicable.

9. For the purposes of any criminal case depending for trial in the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice the words "the day fixed for the trial" shall be substituted for the words "the first sitting of the Court" in Rules 7 and 8.

10. These Rules may be cited as the Women Jurors' (Criminal Cases) Rules, 1920.

And we, the said Rule Committee, hereby certify that on account of urgency the said Rules should come into immediate operation and we hereby make the said Rules to come into operation forthwith as Provisional Rules.

Dated the 15th day of July, 1920

READING, C.J. — HERBERT AUSTIN.
HORACE E. AVORY, J. — W. B. PROSSER.
ROBERT WALLACE.
RICHARD D. MUIR. — Approved
HERBERT STEPHEN. — BIRKENHEAD, C.

Bankruptcy, England.

GENERAL RULES.

THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENT RULES (No. 2), 1920, DATED JULY 12, 1920, MADE PURSUANT TO THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1914 (4 & 5. GEO. 5, C. 59).

1. The following new rule shall be inserted after Rule 188 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1915 :—

Report by Official Receiver where Ground of Application to Rescind Receiving Order or Annul Adjudication is Debts Paid in Full.

188A.—(1) Where an application is made to the Court to rescind a receiving order or annul an order of adjudication on the ground that the debts of the debtor have been paid in full, the Official Receiver shall make and file four days before the day appointed for hearing the application a report as to the debtor's conduct and affairs (including a report as to his conduct during the proceedings), and the Court on the hearing of the application shall hear and consider such report and such further evidence as may be adduced by any party and any objections which may be made by or on behalf of the trustee (if any) or any creditor whom the Court may order to be served with notice of the application or may permit to appear thereon. For the purpose of the application the report shall be *primâ facie* evidence of the statements therein contained.

(2) For the purposes of this rule the expression "creditor" includes all creditors mentioned in the debtor's statement of affairs or who have notified to the Official Receiver or Trustee that they have, or at the date of the receiving order had, claims against the debtor.

Appeals.

2. Rule 229 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1915, shall be annulled and the following Rule shall be substituted therefor :—

Rule 229.—An appeal to the Court of Appeal shall lie at the instance of the Board of Trade, and at the instance of the trustee (if any) from any order of the Court made upon an application for discharge or upon an application for rescession of a receiving order or annulment of adjudication on the ground that the debts of the debtor have been paid in full.

3. The new Form appended to these Rules shall be inserted in Part 1 of the Appendix to the Bankruptcy Rules, 1915, after Form No. 104.

4. These Rules may be cited as the Bankruptcy Amendment Rules (No. 2), 1920, and shall come into operation on the 1st day of August, 1920.

FORM No. 104A.

NOTICE TO OFFICIAL RECEIVER AND TRUSTEE OF APPLICATION FOR ANNULMENT OR RESCISSION ON PAYMENT OF DEBTS IN FULL.

(*Title.*)

The bankrupt (or debtor) having applied to the Court for annulment of the order of adjudication (or rescission of the receiving order) made against him on the ground that he has paid his debts in full, the Court has fixed the day of , 19 , at o'clock in the noon, for hearing the application.

Dated this day of , 19 .

Registrar.

To the Official Receiver
(and Mr.
trustee of the estate of the bankrupt)
12th July.

Treasury Notice.

COLONIAL STOCK ACT, 1900 (63 & 64 VICT., c. 62).

ADDITION TO LIST OF STOCKS UNDER SECTION 2.

Pursuant to Section 2 of the Colonial Stock Act, 1900, the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury hereby give notice that the provisions of the Act have been complied with in respect of the undermentioned Stock, registered or inscribed in the United Kingdom :—

Queensland Government 6 per cent. Inscribed Stock (1930-40).

The restrictions mentioned in Section 2, Sub-section (2) of the Trustee Act, 1893, apply to the above Stock (see Colonial Stock Act, 1900, Section 2).

Board of Trade Orders.

THE PROFITEERING ACTS, 1919 AND 1920, ORDER (No. 15).

[*Recital.*]

Now, therefore, the Board of Trade do hereby declare that the articles of food set out in the Schedule annexed hereto are articles of a kind in common use by the public, and do hereby order that Section 1 of the Profiteering Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 66), as amended by the Profiteering (Amendment) Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 13), shall apply to each article of food specifically mentioned in the Schedule hereto.

This Order shall come into force as from the first day of August, 1920, and may be cited as the Profiteering Acts, 1919 and 1920, Order (No. 15).

30th July.

SCHEDULE.

The following article of food (included in this Schedule by agreement with the Food Controller) :—

56. Apples.

[*Gazette*, August 6.

THE PROFITEERING ACTS, 1919 AND 1920, ORDER (No 9).

[*Recital.*]

Now, therefore, the Board of Trade do hereby extend Section 1 of the Profiteering Act, 1919 (9 and 10 Geo. V., c. 66), to the repairing, altering or washing of all articles of wearing apparel (except boots and shoes), and of cloths and dusters, table and bed linen, blankets, towels, mattresses, pillows, bolsters and curtains, and to any processes incidental thereto; to the repairing, altering or cleaning of clocks and watches, and to the repairing or altering of boots shoes and umbrellas, subject to the following modifications, namely :—that the words "sale," "seller" and "price" shall include treating or offering to treat in any of the manners aforesaid, any person so doing, and the charge for so doing respectively.

This Order shall come into force as from the ninth day of August, 1920, and may be cited as the Profiteering Acts, 1919 and 1920, Order (No. 9).

2nd August.

[*Gazette*, August 10.

Ministry of Food Order.

THE USE OF BREAD (RESTRICTION) ORDER, 1920.

1. Except under and in accordance with the terms of a licence issued by or under the authority of the Food Controller, a person shall not buy or take delivery of any bread for use in the manufacture for sale of sausages, sausage meat, black puddings, fish dressing, the interior of pork or meat pies, or any other like preparation, or use in such manufacture any bread except bread of which he has obtained delivery under and in accordance with the terms of such licence.

2. A person shall not sell or make delivery of any bread if he believes or has reasonable grounds for believing that the bread is or may be required for use in the manufacture for sale of any such article as aforesaid unless a licence authorising such delivery has been handed to him. Such licence shall be sent by him to the Food Controller, together with such particulars in relation to the bread as the Food Controller may from time to time direct.

3. Where a person sells any bread for use in the manufacture for sale of any such article as aforesaid, he shall at the time of sale enter in a record kept for the purpose :—

(*a*) the weight of the bread so sold;
(*b*) the date of the sale and of the delivery, and
(*c*) the name and address of the buyer.

Such record shall be kept on the premises where the bread is made and shall be open on demand to inspection by any person authorised by the Food Controller or a Commissioner.

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of Clauses 1 and 2, a person may without a licence take delivery for use in the manufacture for sale of any such article as aforesaid of an amount of bread not exceeding from all sources 6 cwts. in any one week and use the same accordingly, and a person may without the production of a licence make delivery of bread for such use provided that the total amount delivered by him to all customers in any one week shall not exceed 3 cwts.

5. This Order shall not apply to bread made from flour of which delivery has been lawfully taken for a precluded purpose under a licence granted for the purposes of the Flour and Bread (Prices) Order, 1920. [S. R. & O. No. 442 of 1920.]

6. Infringements of this Order are summary offences against the Defence of the Realm Regulations

7. The Bread (Use in Sausages) Order, 1920 [S.R & O., No. 596 of 1920], is hereby revoked as on the 19th July, 1920, but without prejudice to any proceedings in respect of any contravention thereof.

8. For the purpose of this Order "Commissioner" means in England and Wales any person appointed by the Food Controller as Divisional Food Commissioner, and in Scotland the person appointed by the Food Controller as Food Commissioner for Scotland.

9. This Order may be cited as the Use of Bread (Restriction) Order, 1920, and shall come into force on the 19th July, 1920.

19th July.

The Juvenile Courts Bill.

The House of Lords on 6th inst. went into Committee on the Juvenile Courts (Metropolis) Bill, the Earl of Donoughmore in the Chair.

The Lord Chancellor, says the *Times*, in moving a series of amendments to Clause 1, reviewed the differences of opinion shown when the Bill was previously in Committee, and said it seemed to him essential that women should be associated with this work and sit and act on equal terms with their colleagues. The treatment of children who had offended against the law or come within the purview of the Petty Sessional Court ought to be dissociated from the ordinary administration of the criminal law, and such cases ought to be heard in buildings not used for criminal business. The amendments which he would move went as far in the direction of meeting the wishes of the metropolitan police magistrates as was possible in the circumstances. The proposals of the Government would be satisfactory to lay opinion. The Government were abandoning the proposal that there should be only one police magistrate selected for this work. The Secretary of State would be empowered to select such numbers of magistrates as experience demonstrated to be necessary. His amendments also provided for the Juvenile Courts being held elsewhere than in the buildings used as metropolitan police courts, and directed that the Home Secretary in nominating the magistrates to be presidents of Juvenile Courts should have regard to their previous experience and special qualifications for dealing with juvenile offenders.

The amendments were agreed to, and the Bill passed through Committee.

Obituary.

Mr. T. S. Soden.

The death took place on the 5th inst. at 1, Courthope-road, Wimbledon, of Mr. THOMAS SPOONER SODEN, barrister, who was formerly Recorder of Grantham and Assistant Recorder of Birmingham.

Mr. Soden, who was aged 83, was son of the late John Smith Soden, F.R.C.S., and was educated privately and at Exeter College, Oxford. Called to the Bar at the Middle Temple 58 years ago, he joined the Midland Circuit, and only six years after his call he was appointed a revising barrister for a short period, and later on, from 1875 to 1901, he worked in a similar capacity. He was appointed to the Assistant Recordership of Birmingham in 1882, and held the office for 30 years, part of the time with the Recordership of Grantham, to which he was appointed in 1897. He was also for a time counsel for the Mint at Warwick Assizes and Sessions. He was joint author of Smith and Soden's "Landlord and Tenant," and was a member of the Athenæum Club. Mr. Soden was a widower, his wife, the younger daughter of the late Edward Cator Seaton, F.R.C.P., of the Local Government Board, having died in 1911.

Legal News.

Appointments.

The Attorney-General has appointed Mr. H. D. ROOME, of 5, Paper-buildings, Temple, to the post of Third Junior Prosecuting Counsel for the Crown at the Central Criminal Court, rendered vacant by the appointment of Sir Archibald Bodkin as Director of Public Prosecutions and the promotion of Mr. Percival Clarke. Mr. H. D. Roome is a member of the Middle Temple, was called to the Bar in 1907, and has practised on the South-Eastern Circuit and at the North and South London, Middlesex, and Kent Sessions, and the Central Criminal Court.

The Attorney-General has appointed Mr. VERNON R. M. GATTIE, of 5, Paper-buildings, Temple, to be Prosecuting Counsel for the Crown at the Middlesex Sessions, in succession to Mr. H. D. Roome.

Changes in Partnerships.

Dissolutions.

ROBERT ASHBURN EDGAR, RICHARD WALTER RYLANDS, and JOHN GRACE, solicitors (Boote, Edgar, Grace and Rylands), 20, Booth-street, Manchester. July 24. As regards the said John Grace, who is retiring from practice. [*Gazette*, August 6.

CHARLES GOVER WOODROFFE, EDWARD SHRIMPTON WOODROFFE, and WILLIAM AUGUSTUS ASHBY, solicitors (Woodroffes and Ashby), 18, Great Dover-street, London, 39, Eastcheap, London, and 235, Westminster Bridge-road, London. July 31. The said Charles Gover Woodroffe and Edward Shrimpton Woodroffe will continue to carry on business at the above addresses with Kenneth Derry Woodroffe and Geoffrey Edward Woodroffe, whom they are taking into partnership, under the style of "Woodroffes"; the said William Augustus Ashby will carry on business in his own name at 105, Newington-causeway, London, S.E. 1.

[*Gazette*, August 10.

General.

Mr. W. C. Renshaw, K.C., and Mrs. Renshaw, of Sandrocks, Haywards Heath, celebrated their golden wedding on Wednesday. Before his retirement some years ago Mr. Renshaw, who will be eighty years of age next month, had a large practice at the Chancery Bar. For many years he was a member of the Bar Council and of the Supreme Court Rules Committee.

In a written reply to Mr. Tyson Wilson, Mr. Bridgeman, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, states that the settlement arrived at in regard to the Crown's claim to the foreshore at Seaview, Isle of Wight, was to the effect that the defendants recognized the right of the Crown to the foreshore between ordinary high and low water mark along the coasts of the Isle of Wight between Ferniclose Brook in Sea Grove Bay on the south-east and Springvale on the north-west.

Winding-up Notices.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, Aug. 6.

J. & J. E. BOAM, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Aug. 12, to send in their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to Herbert James Davidson, 3, Cathedral-gates, Manchester, liquidator.

WARWICK MILL CO., LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 10, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Roberts Lord, Irwell-ter., Bacup, liquidator.

SPARTH SPINNING CO., LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 10, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Roberts Lord, Irwell-ter., Bacup, liquidator.

MATHER LANE SPINNING CO., LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 15, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Roberts Lord, Irwell-ter., Bacup, liquidator.

LABURNUM SPINNING CO., LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Aug. 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Thomas Boardman, 49, Spring-gdns., Manchester, liquidator.

WALKDEN SPINNING AND MANUFACTURING CO., LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Aug. 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Thomas Boardman, 49, Spring-gdns., Manchester, liquidator.

BROWN'S PICTURES, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 10, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts and claims, to Jno. T. Slater, 11, Queen-st., Oldham, liquidator.

TELOK BETONG (SUMATRA) SYNDICATE, LTD. (IN VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 4, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Archibald Hugh Doherty, 65, London-wall, liquidator.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, Aug. 10.

CRAWFORD SPINNING CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 16, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Roberts Lord, Irwell-ter., Bacup, liquidator.

WARD & SCOTT, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 30, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Henry Mossop, Ramsden-sq., Barrow-in-Furness, liquidator.

JOHN PETRIE, JUNR., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 23, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Charles Edward Lewis, 3, King-st., Rochdale, liquidator.

WILBERFORCE HOTEL (BOURNEMOUTH), LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 15, to send in their names and addresses, and full particulars of their debts or claims, to Edward Bicker, Wilts and Dorset Bank-chmbrs., Bournemouth, liquidator.

LYSLE EXPORT AND IMPORT CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Aug. 28, to send in their names and addresses, and full particulars of their debts or claims, to Cecil Stewart Denham, 21, Bedford-row, liquidator.

WEST AND CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Aug. 21, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts and claims, to Charles Joseph Manning, 8, Argyle-ter., Plymouth, liquidator.

INDO-CHINESE HEVEA RUBBER ESTATES, LTD. (IN LIQUIDATION.)—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 20, to send their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to John Douglas Broad, 1, Walbrook, liquidator.

BROWN'S MOTOR HAULAGE CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 3, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Arthur Clifford Ridgway, Exchange-bldgs., New-st., Birmingham, liquidator.

BRITISH DREDGING CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Oct. 1, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to John Morgan Richards Francis, 27, Walbrook, liquidator.

GEORGE CRADOCK & CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 15, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Sir William Barclay Peat, 11, Ironmonger-lane, liquidator.

ROYMER VALE COLLIERIES, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 15, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Sir William Barclay Peat, 11, Ironmonger-lane, liquidator.

DISTINGTON HEMATITE IRON CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 15, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Sir William Barclay Peat, 11, Ironmonger-lane, liquidator.

WORKINGTON IRON AND STEEL CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 15, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Sir William Barclay Peat, 11, Ironmonger-lane, liquidator.

BIORICO MINING CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Aug. 31, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Sir William Barclay Peat, 11, Ironmonger-lane, liquidator.

BICKERSHIT MINING CO., LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 15, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Sir William Barclay Peat, 11, Ironmonger-lane, liquidator.
COLISEUM PICTURE HOUSE (PRESTON), LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 3rd, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to James Todd, 7, Winckley-sq., Preston, liquidator.
CUMBERLAND PITWOOD ASSOCIATION, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Sept. 14, to send their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to Joseph Angus Forster, 125, Ramsden-sq., Barrow-in-Furness, liquidator.
BIRKENHEAD WHOLESALE MEAT SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, LTD.—Creditors are required, on or before Aug. 31, to send in their names and addresses, and particulars of their debts or claims, to Thomas H. Jackson, Woodside Lairage, Birkenhead, liquidator.

Resolutions for Winding-up Voluntarily.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, Aug. 6.

Palace Shipping Co., Ltd.
Tunbridge Taxicabs, Ltd.
Brown's Pictures, Ltd.
West of England Window Cleaning Co., Ltd.
New Schooner Sugar Plantation Co., Ltd.
Dorset Glass Co., Ltd.
Dill & Co., Ltd.
William Frost (Heanor), Ltd.
A. F. S., Ltd.
J. & J. E. Boam, Ltd.
M. W. Swinburne & Sons, Ltd.
Lington Engineering Co., Ltd.
Ebor Fishing Co., Ltd.
North British Electric Welding Co., Ltd.
Williamson & Corder, Ltd.
Laburnum Spinning Co., Ltd.
Shipping & Transport Co., Ltd.
Walkden Spinning and Manufacturing Co., Ltd.
Clegg & Taylor, Ltd.
H. C. Motor Co., Ltd.
B.B.B. Button Co., Ltd.
Scrubb & Co. (France), Ltd.
Dominion Pulp Co., Ltd.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, Aug. 10.

E. N. Beavis & Co., Ltd.
Coliseum Picture House (Preston), Ltd.
G. A. Telfer, Ltd.
Kwall Tin-fields of Nigeria, Ltd.
Bickers & Co., Ltd.
Fairbanks Gold Mining Co., Ltd.
West & Co., Ltd.
Cuhelyn Temperance Hotel Co., Ltd.
Hippodrome Scarborough, Ltd.
Tumok Rubber Estate, Ltd.
Mid-Wales Basket Co., Ltd.
W. Scott & Co., Ltd.
New British Agency, Ltd.
Archd. Mackenzie (London), Ltd.
Beavis' (Sports), Ltd.
School Hill Creamery, Ltd.
Olympia (Newport, Mon.), Ltd.
Gosport Olympia, Ltd.
D. D. Walker Co., Ltd.
Willie Farrar, Ltd.
Pavilion and Empress Theatres (Abertillery), Ltd.
Greene's Pictures (Normanton), Ltd.
Normanton Assembly Room Co., Ltd.
E. P. Co., Ltd.
Vroom & Dreesman, Ltd.
J. & A. Moore, Ltd.

Creditors' Notices.

Under 22 & 23 Vict. cap. 35.

LAST DAY OF CLAIM.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, Aug. 6.

ALLNUTT, ARTHUR CHARLES, Colombo, Ceylon. Sept. 17. Freeman & Cooke, 22, Surrey-st., Victoria Embankment.
BICKMORE, CHARLES, Marks Tey, Essex. Sept. 15. Beaumont & Son, Coggeshall, Essex.
BODEN, WALTER, Hale, Chester. Oct. 1. Bullock, Worthington & Jackson, Manchester.
BROWN, CHARLES LOCKIE, Steel Bank, Sheffield. Sept. 11. Benson, Burdekin & Co., Sheffield.
BURT, GEORGE, Rotherfield, Sussex. Sept. 17. Freeman & Cooke, 22, Surrey-st., Victoria Embankment.
COOKE, ALFRED WILLIAM, Bighton, Hants. Aug. 14. Shield & Mackarness, Alresford.
COTTON, JAMES BURCHELL, Muskeliya, Ceylon. Sept. 17. Freeman & Cooke, 22, Surrey-st., Victoria Embankment.
DICKSON, ALFRED, Bengasi, Cirenaica, North Africa. Sept. 4. Capron & Co., 7, Savile-pl., Conduit-st.
DIETZ, EMILE THEOPHILE, Hanover Gate-mansns., Regent's Park, Stockbroker. Aug. 20. Simon, Haynes, Barlee & Ireland, 23, Mortimer-st.
EGERTON, SARAH, Blackpool. Sept. 7. Crofton, Craven & Co., Manchester.
FARTHING, ARTHUR WILLIAM, Brighton. Sept. 6. J. E. Bush, Brighton.
FREEMAN, RUSSELL HERBERT, Westbourne-ter., Hyde Park. Sept. 17. Freeman & Cooke, 22, Surrey-st., Victoria Embankment.
GAUNT, WILLIAM, Dukinfield, Chester. Sept. 11. Jas. Crowther, Ashton-under-Lyne.
GENTRY, MARY ELIZABETH, Portman-mews, South Portman-st., Licensed Victualler. Aug. 30. Timbrell & Deighton, 20, Cannon-st.
GORDON, WILLIAM ARTHUR, Udapussellawa, Ceylon. Sept. 17. Freeman & Cooke, 22, Surrey-st., Victoria Embankment.
HALL, HENRIETTA MARIA, St. Julian's Farm-rd., West Norwood. Sept. 15. Stones, Morris & Stone, 41, Moorgate-st.
HAMMACK, FLORENCE, Hove. Sept. 10. Paice & Cross, 12, Old-sq., Lincoln's Inn.
HANBURY, Rev. and Hon. ARTHUR ALLEN BATEMAN, Shobdon Rectory, Hereford. Nov. 2. Lloyd & Son, Leominster.
HARROP, ELIZA, Oldham, and ANNIE HARROP, South Shore, Blackpool. Sept. 8. William Lees, Oldham.
HUDSON, GEORGE, Brighton, Poulterer. Aug. 26. Griffith, Smith & Wade, 47, Old Steyne, Brighton.
INGRAM, HERBERT FREDERICK, Cambridge, Music Dealer. Sept. 6. John F. Symonds, Cambridge.
JACKSON, Sir JOHN, Belgrave-sq. Sept. 18. Batten, Proffitt, Scott & Weddell, 13, Victoria-st., Westminster.
JOHNSON, EDWIN ELTHAM, Croydon, Chartered Accountant. Aug. 31. Bridgman & Co., 4, College-hill, Cannon-st.
KITTRICK, EMILY MARY, Hove. Sept. 10. James & James, 23, Ely-pl., Holborn-circus.
LANGTON, BENJAMIN, Knaresborough, Yorks, Ironmonger's Manager. Oct. 5. Kirby, Son & Atkinson, Knaresborough.
LEWIS, MARTIN LUTHER, Leicester. Sept. 7. Edward J. Holyoak, Leicester.
LEWIS, ANN WOODRUFF, Leicester. Sept. 7. Edward J. Holyoak, Leicester.
LEWIS, EMMA ANNE, Weybridge. Sept. 14. Fowler, Legg & Young, 13, Bedford-row.
MACLEOD, Admiral ANGUS, Victoria-st., Westminster. Sept. 18. C. St. John Roche, Purley, Surrey.
MCGOWN, WILLIAM JOHN, Sale, Cheshire, Coloured Goods Manufacturer. Sept. 8. Chapman, Roberts & Beck, Manchester.
METHVEN, CATHERINE EMILY, Folkestone. Sept. 8. A. D. & L. J. D. Brockman, Folkestone.
MILLER, ISABELLA ANN, Palmers Green. Sept. 4. Harston & Bennett, 35, Lincoln's Inn-fields.
MILLSON, HENRY, Grove Park, Lee, Kent, Licensed Victualler. Aug. 31. W. R. Millar & Sons, 22, St. Thomas-st., London Bridge.
MOSS, ALFRED JOHN, Bride-ct. Sept. 4. Warrington, Rogers & Wilcox, 17, Victoria-st., Westminster.
OLIVER, WILLIAM ARTHUR, Cheadle, Cheshire. Sept. 8. Chapman, Roberts & Beck, Manchester.
PICKWELL, LUCY, Coningham-rd., Shepherd's Bush. Sept. 3. Bird & Bird, 5, Gray's Inn-sq.
PINSON, JOHN, Finchfield, Wolverhampton. Aug. 31. R. A. Willcock, Taylor & Co., Wolverhampton.
ROBBINS, FREDERICK WALTER, Wolverhampton. Sept. 1. Alfred Turton, Wolverhampton.
SEATON, GEORGE WALTER, Brixton, Butcher. Aug. 31. Seatliffe, 353, Strand.
TAYLOR, SEDLEY, University of Cambridge. Sept. 25. Esden, Spearing & Raynes, Cambridge.
THIENPONDT, BERNARD, Antwerp, Belgium. Aug. 20. E. Chatham & Co., Manchester.
THOMSON, ROBERT TEMPLE, Edenbridge, Kent. Sept. 17. Freeman & Cooke, 22, Surrey-st., Victoria Embankment.
TOPHAM, JAMES, Wootton, Lincs. Aug. 21. Walker, Sons & Rainey, Spilsby.
VANDERLIP, HANNAH, Wolverhampton. Aug. 31. R. A. Willcock, Taylor & Co., Wolverhampton.
WARD, ELIZABETH ANN, Clapham. Sept. 17. Sole, Turner & Knight, 68, Aldermanbury.
WEBB, MABEL ALICE, Battersea. Sept. 9. Theodore Goddard & Co., 10, Serjeants'-inn, Temple.
WOMERSLEY, SUSANNAH, Whitegate, Halifax. Sept. 4. Lewis I. Dey, Halifax.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, Aug. 10.

AINSWORTH, DAVID, Ambleside, Lancs. Sept. 17. Finch, Johnson & Co., Preston.
AINSWORTH, MARGARET, Ambleside, Lancs. Sept. 17. Finch, Johnson & Co., Preston.
BALFOUR, ERNEST CLAUDE, Southfields, Clerk. Sept. 14. Taylor, Hoare & Jelf, 12, Norfolk-st., Strand.
BARCLAY, AMY CAPEL, Burgess Hill. Sept. 20. H. Montague Williams, Brighton.
BARNES, EDMUND WILSON, Carrigrohane, County Cork, Ireland. Sept. 6. Bird & Bird, 5, Gray's Inn-sq.
BARNES, GEORGE, West Kensington. Sept. 5. Bird & Bird, 5, Gray's Inn-sq.
BARTRUM, WILLIAM HENRY, Southport. Oct. 1. Tucker, Tucker & Richardson, Manchester.
BENBOW, MARIA, Teignmouth. Sept. 18. Tozer & Dell, Teignmouth, Devon.
BOWYER, CHARLES HENRY, Midhurst, Chemist. Sept. 7. Johnson & Clarence, Midhurst.
BROWN, WILLIAM HENRY ERNEST ASHLEY JOHNSTON, Brighton. Sept. 17. Druces & Attlee, 10, Billiter-sq.
BUNTING, FRED, Bromley, Kent. Sept. 14. John H. Hodge, Bromley, Kent.
BURROW, MARY ANN, Ottery St. Mary, Devon. Aug. 25. Tweed & Son, Honiton, Devon.
COOPER, MARY ANN, Colchester. Sept. 29. Elwes & Turner, Colchester.
COPPOCK, CHARLES EDWARD, Hale, Cheshire. Sept. 18. Lawson, Coppock & Hart, Manchester.

COBBER, NORA, Rotherham. Sept. 18. W. J. Bradford, Rotherham.
COOPER, EDWIN, Hove. Sept. 20. W. H. & A. G. Herbert, 30, Cork-st.
DAVIES, THOMAS JOHN, Thornton, Bradford, Surveyor. Sept. 19. J. H. Richardson & Sons, Bradford.
DAVIS, CHARLES WILLIAM, Kendal. Sept. 31. J. E. Bolton, Kendal.
DAWSON, LINA HENRIETTA BLANCHE, Yateley. Sept. 6. Crosse & Sons, 36, Bedford-sq., Bloomsbury.
DEAKIN, MARGERY, Croyde, Devon. Sept. 15. G. W. F. Brown, Barnstaple.
DEWHURST, BARBARA ELLEN, Southport. Sept. 7. Brown, Brown & Quayle, Southport.
FABER, ANNIE MARIA, Hampstead. Sept. 10. Roney & Co., 42-5, New Broad-st.
HAUSMANN, ALBERT, Paper-st., Merchant. Sept. 9. Palmer, Bull & Bartlett, 24, Bedford-row.
HENRY, Colonel THOMAS ALLAN, Ledbury, Hereford. Sept. 17. Janson, Cobb, Pearson & Co., 22, College-hill.
HIATT, ADELAIDE, Newport, Lincoln. Aug. 31. Gaunt, Foster & Co., Bradford.
HIGGINS, EMILY ANNE, Bromley. Sept. 15. W. G. Miles, Dorchester.
HODGSON, Rev. THOMAS TARLETON, Birmingham. Sept. 18. Toser & Dell, Teignmouth, Devon.
HORRIDGE, MARY, Llandudno. Sept. 20. R. S. Taylor, Son & Humbert, 4, Field-ct., Gray's Inn.
HORTON, THOMAS, Handsworth. Sept. 24. James Rigbey, Son & Brown, Birmingham.
HORTON, MARY ANN, Handsworth. Sept. 24. James Rigbey, Son & Brown, Birmingham.
HOSKINS, FREDERICK CHARLES, Upper Tooting. Aug. 31. Herbert A. Phillips, 46, South-st., Finsbury.
HUMPHREYS, FLORENCE, Eccleston-sq. Sept. 30. Stewart & Lloyd, 3 and 4, Lincoln's Inn-fields.
IRONSIDE, ALEXANDER BAILEY, Sunderland, Commission Agent. Aug. 26. Chas. R. Walker, Sunderland.
JOHNS, AMY MARIA, Sydenham. Sept. 30. W. M. Marchant, 4, King's Bench-walk, Temple.
LEDGER, MARION ALDIS, Barnes. Sept. 4. Snow, Fox, Higginson & Thompson, 7, Great St. Thomas Apostle, Queen-st.
LEDWARD, ELIZA ANNE, West Kirby, Cheshire. Sept. 1. Woolcott & Co., West Kirby, Cheshire.
LYSTER, ANTHONY GEORGE, Gloucester-gate, Regent's Park. Sept. 5. Godsden & Pennefather, 28, Bedford-row.
MAUNDER, FREDERICK, Cheltenham. Sept. 10. Heath & Eckersall, Cheltenham.
MICHELL, FLORENCE, East Lise, Hants. Sept. 6. Greenwell, Higham & Co., 4, Berners-st., Oxford-st.
MULCASTER, BERNARD FREDERICK STEPHEN, Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Sept. 29. Dickinson, Miller & Turnbull, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
NASMITH, CHARLES WILLIAM, Manchester. Sept. 18. Lawson, Coppock & Hart, Manchester.
NEWLING, GEORGE THOMAS, Percy-st., Tottenham Court-rd. Sept. 6. Greenwell, Higham & Co., 4, Berners-st., Oxford-st.
NORMAN, FREDERICK LUDWIG, Kingston-upon-Hull. Sept. 5. Andw. M. Jackson & Co., Hull.
NORMAN, HAROLD LENHAM, Kingston-upon-Hull. Sept. 5. Andw. M. Jackson & Co., Hull.
POWELL, CHRISTINA ELIZABETH, Liverpool. Sept. 5. Yates & Co., Liverpool.
PRICHARD, WALTER STENNETT, Bedford-row, Solicitor. Sept. 25. Collisson, Prichard & Barnes, 27, Bedford-row.
QUINN, JAMES, Jersey. Sept. 6. William A. Crump & Son, 17, Leadenhall-st.
RACE, RODOLPH LEOPOLD, Harringay. Sept. 10. Roney & Co., 42-5, New Broad-st.
RADCLIFF, MARGARET, Perham-rd. Sept. 16. D. E. Davies, Newbury, Berks.
RING, JOHN FRANCIS, Brighton. Sept. 10. G. N. Mirams, Brighton.
SANDERSON, ELMA MARGARET, Hove. Sept. 10. Herbert Glenister, 1, New-sq., Lincoln's Inn.
SARSFIELD, CATHERINE, Shaldon, Devon. Sept. 18. Toser & Dell, Teignmouth, Devon.
SCOTT, WILLIAM HUDSON, Carlisle. Sept. 6. Clutterbuck, Trevenen & Steele, Carlisle.
SLATER, HANNAH, Richmond, Yorks. Aug. 31. Rogers & Hudson, Richmond, Yorks.
TOWNLEY, MARY ELIZABETH, Weymouth. Sept. 18. Toser & Dell, Teignmouth, Devon.
TRATMAN, ALFRED SAUNDERS, Ventnor. Sept. 10. Jackson & Jackson, Devizes.
WHEELDON, CHARLES, Wolverhampton, Engineer. Sept. 4. Fowler, Langley & Wright, Wolverhampton.
WILLIAMS, JOHN LLOYD, T.D., Bushey, Herts. Sept. 6. Flegg & Son, 3, Laurence Pountney-hill.

Bankruptcy Notices.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, July 30.

RECEIVING ORDERS RESCINDED.

HARBORD, Capt. the Hon. VICTOR ALEX. CHARLES, Brook-st., Bond-st. High Court. Ord. Resc., Rec. Ord. July 7. Resc. July 28.
THOMAS, GEORGE, Walton-on-Thames, Surrey, Jeweller. Kingston, Surrey. Ord. Resc., Rec. Ord. May 6. Resc. July 13.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, Aug. 3.

RECEIVING ORDERS.

BEILIS, HARRY, Buxton-st., Stepney, Journeyman Baker. High Court. Pet. July 29. Ord. July 29.
BREAKS, JOHN STODDART, Bridlington, Automobile Engineer. Scarborough. Pet. July 28. Ord. July 28.
CHRISTY, MILLER, Chelmsford. Chelmsford. Pet. July 2. Ord. July 29.
DERRICK, BERT, Neath, Fruiterer. Neath. Pet. July 16. Ord. July 29.
DENNELL, WALTER, Heeley, Sheffield, Engineer. Pet. July 31. Ord. July 31.
EMBERRY, LEONARD PERCIVAL, Exeter, Tailor. Exeter. Pet. July 29. Ord. July 29.
FRIEND, PERCY, West Malling, Kent, Job Master, Maidstone. Pet. July 28. Ord. July 28.
HEAVER, CHARLES, Aldingbourne Mill, near Chichester, Miller. Brighton. Pet. July 7. Ord. July 30.
HILTON, THOMAS, Ashbourne, Greengrocer. Burton-on-Trent. Pet. July 29. Ord. July 29.
POPPLE, HAROLD, Great Grimsby, Fish Curer's Manager. Great Grimsby. Pet. July 27. Ord. July 29.
RICHARDS, WILLIAM, Aberavon, Glam, Mason. Neath. Pet. July 30. Ord. July 30.
RUSHTON, FRED, Crickhowell, Hereford, Shop Fitter. Hereford. Pet. July 31. Ord. July 31.
RUSSELL, MARIE LOIS, Keswick, Confectioner. Cockermouth. Pet. July 30. Ord. July 30.
SCHLESS, MYER, Liverpool, Cabinet Maker, Liverpool. Pet. July 29. Ord. July 29.
SHERRATT, EDWARD ELIJAH, Haberdasher-st., New North-rd. Pet. June 29. Ord. July 29.
STROTHER, THOMAS, Sheffield, Automobile Engineer, Scarborough. Pet. July 29. Ord. July 29.
TOOHEY, MARY C. High Court. Pet. June 10. Ord. July 29.

FIRST MEETINGS.

BEILIS, HARRY, Stepney, Journeyman Baker. Aug. 12 at 12. Bankruptcy-bldgs., Carey-st.
EMBERRY, LEONARD PERCIVAL, Exeter, Tailor. Aug. 12 at 3. Off. Rec., Bedford-circus, Exeter.
FRIEND, PERCY, West Malling, Kent, Jobmaster. Aug. 13 at 11.30. Off. Rec., 280a, High-st., Rochester.
JOHN, JAMES EMLYN, Swansea, Greengrocer. Aug. 12 at 12. Off. Rec., St. Mary's-st., Swansea. Sept. 24 at 11. Town Hall, Swansea.
OWEN, WILLIAM, Bootle, Builder. Aug. 11 at 11.30. Off. Rec. 11, Dale-st, Liverpool.
SHERRATT, EDWARD ELIJAH, Haberdasher-st, New North-rd. Aug. 12 at 11. Bankruptcy-bldgs., Carey-st.
STRONGITHARM, JOSEPH, Hightown, Manchester, Poultry Dealer. Aug. 11 at 3. Off. Rec., Byrom-st., Manchester.
TATTERSFIELD, ARNOLD, Dewsbury Moor, Dewsbury, Rag Merchant. Aug. 13 at 11. County Court House, Dewsbury.
TOOHEY, MARY C. Aug. 13 at 12. Bankruptcy-bldgs., Carey-st.
WALKER, FRANK, Manchester. Aug. 11 at 3.30. Off. Rec., Byrom-st., Manchester.
WINTER, RAOUL, Kew Gardens, Surrey. Aug. 12 at 12. 133, York-rd., Westminster Bridge-rd.

ADJUDICATIONS.

BEILIS, HARRY, Stepney, Journey Baker. High Court. Pet. July 29. Ord. 29.
BREAKS, JOHN STODDART, Bridlington, Automobile Engineer. Scarborough. Pet. July 28. Ord. July 28.
EMBERRY, LEONARD PERCIVAL, Exeter, Tailor. Exeter. Pet. July 29. Ord. July 29.
HILTON, THOMAS, Ashbourne, Derby, Greengrocer. Burton-on-Trent. Pet. July 29. Ord. July 29.
MORTON, JAMES WILLIAM, Newton Heath, Manchester, Greengrocer. Manchester. Pet. July 14. Ord. July 29.
POPPLE, HAROLD, Great Grimsby, Fish Curer's Manager. Great Grimsby. Pet. July 27. Ord. July 29.
SCHLESS, MYER, Liverpool, Cabinet Maker. Liverpool. Pet. July 29. Ord. July 29.
SOLSBERG, JOSEPH, Music Hall Artiste, and MARGARET SOLSBERG, Mill-lane, West Hampstead. High Court. Pet. June 15. Ord. July 29.
STRONGITHARM, JOSEPH, Hightown, Manchester, Poultry Dealer. Manchester. Pet. July 24. Ord. July 29.
STROTHER, THOMAS, Sheffield, Automobile Engineer. Scarborough. Pet. July 29. Ord. July 29.
WITHAM, JOHN, and NELLIE WITHAM, Wimbledon, Surrey, Cycle Dealers. Kingston. Pet. June 24. Ord. July 30.
ZIEGEL, L., Oxford-st., Foreign Bookseller. High Court. Pet. June 1. Ord. July 29.

ADJUDICATION ANNULLED AND RECEIVING ORDER RESCINDED.

SMITH, ALFONSO FRANCIS AUSTIN, Green-st., Park-lane. High Court. Adju. Mar. 25, 1915. Rec. Ord. Feb. 26, 1914. Annul. and Resc. July 26, 1920.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, Aug. 6.

RECEIVING ORDERS.

BIDDLE, FRANK, Coventry, Fruiterer. Coventry. Pet. July 19. Ord. July 29.
BOWLES, EDMUND EDWARD, Ryde, I. of W., Bootmaker. Newport. Pet. Aug. 3. Ord. Aug. 3.
CUTTER, ALBERT VICTOR, Stockton-on-Tees, Joiner. Stockton-on-Tees. Pet. Aug. 3. Ord. Aug. 3.
ROMANS, THOMAS, Selby, Yorks, Shoeing Smith. York. Pet. Aug. 3. Ord. Aug. 3.
WEINSTEIN, ALEXANDER, Liverpool, Optician. Liverpool. Pet. July 19. Ord. Aug. 4.
WILLIAMS, ELIZABETH, Penrhyndeudraeth, Grocer. Portmadoc. Pet. Aug. 3. Ord. Aug. 4.
WINTER, RAOUL, Kew Gardens. Wandsworth. Pet. June 15. Ord. July 29.

FIRST MEETINGS.

FROST, MILLICENT GWENDOLINE BLAIR, Harrogate. Aug. 19 at 2.30. Off. Rec., The Red House, Duncombe-pl., York.
POPPLE, HAROLD, Great Grimsby, Fish Curer's Manager. Aug. 14 at 11. Off. Rec., St. Mary's-chmbrs., Great Grimsby.
SMYTH, WALTER JOHN, Milton, Cambs, Grocer. Aug. 13 at 11.30. Off. Rec., 5, Petty-cury, Cambridge.
STAMP, ALBERT, Norwich, Carter. Aug. 14 at 12.30. Off. Rec., 8, Upper King-st., Norwich.
WALKER, TOM, Stalybridge, Licensed Victualler. Aug. 16 at 3. Off. Rec., Byrom-st., Manchester.

ADJUDICATIONS.

BOWLES, EDMUND EDWARD, Ryde, I. of W., Bootmaker. Newport. Pet. Aug. 3. Ord. Aug. 3.
CUTTER, ALBERT VICTOR, Stockton-on-Tees, Joiner. Stockton-on-Tees. Pet. Aug. 3. Ord. Aug. 3.
DENNELL, WALTER, Heeley, Sheffield, Engineer. Sheffield. Pet. July 31. Ord. July 31.
DERRICK, BERT, Neath, Glam., Fruiterer. Neath. Pet. July 16. Ord. July 30.
DOBBS, MATTHEW, Epsom, M.D. High Court. Pet. June 29. Ord. July 31.
LAYE, PETER ARTHUR WEBB, Eaton-sq. High Court. Pet. May 19. Ord. Aug. 4.
MACALLAN, JAMES B., Old Broad-st., Merchant. High Court. Pet. June 14. Ord. Aug. 4.
MILLER, F. M., Sutherland-pl., Bayswater. High Court. Pet. Jan. 5. Ord. Aug. 4.
OWEN, WILLIAM, Bootle, Builder. Liverpool. Pet. July 5. Ord. July 31.
PICKERING, —, Chalfont-ct., Upper Baker-st. High Court. Pet. March 11. Ord. July 30.
RICHARDS, WILLIAM, Aberavon, Mason. Neath. Pet. July 30. Ord. July 30.
ROBBINS, EDWIN, Evesham, Fruit Merchant. Worcester. Pet. July 13. Ord. July 30.
ROMANS, THOMAS, Burn, near Selby, Yorks, Shoeing Smith. York. Pet. Aug. 3. Ord. Aug. 3.
RUSSELL, MARIE LOIS, Keswick, Confectioner. Cockermouth. Pet. July 30. Ord. July 30.
SHERRATT, EDWARD ELIJAH, Haberdasher-st., New North-rd. High Court. Pet. June 29. Ord. July 30.
STICKLAND, JOHN, Hampton Wick, Builder. Kingston. Pet. May 4. Ord. July 31.
TAYLOR, ROBERT NATHANIEL, Elsham-rd., Kensington, Theatrical Producer. High Court. Pet. July 8. Ord. July 30.
WILLIAMS, ELIZABETH, Penrhyndeudraeth, Grocer. Portmadoc. Pet. Aug. 4. Ord. Aug. 4.